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Abstract 
With regards to ecology, there has been a constant struggle 
between the scientific perspective and the philosophical 
approaches. This commentary dwells on the nature and 
structure of voices emerging from feminist 
environmentalists. Analogous to the feminist 
understanding that environmental degradation is a symbol 
of masculine domination leading to the suppression of the 
feminine, this paper tries to excavate the nature of a 
feminist perspective to environmental ethics. 
Keywords: Modernity, Dominance, Anthropocentrism, Biocentrism, 
Ecofeminism 
1. Introduction  
Scientists, policymakers, environmental activists and philosophers 
around the globe are working ceaselessly to curtail the problem of 
environmental catastrophes. Since the scientific solutions seem 
fuzzy, philosophers are in search of alternative predicaments to 
challenge the traditional view regarding the environment. In this 
regard, the traditional predicament fitted with modernity has to be 
rejected. To do that, one needs to question the basic conceptual 
scaffoldings of mighty modernity. The feminist approach to 
environmental problems has adequate strength to do this job. 
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At the outset, the authenticity and morality of basic concepts of 
modernity will be questioned and how these concepts are 
responsible for making a dividing and dominating predicament 
towards nature much similar towards the feminine by the masculine 
will be shown. Further, the feminist view as an alluring alternative 
to solve the environmental problems by dissolving the seeming 
bifurcation will be provided.  The study is limited to the feminist 
approach that contributes to the development of environmental 
philosophy. 
2. Modernity and Discontent   
A seeming truism is to assert ‘that the source of ongoing natural 
catastrophes and environmental crisis is the anthropocentric 
paradigm’. The paradigm, dating back to Greek philosopher 
Protagoras via Aristotle, and Christianity and manifested through 
modern science, constructed a man-centred universe. That this 
paradigm has destroyed nature enormously can be conspicuously 
verified in the morning news. While few are scary like those that 
read that the mighty ocean would eat up megacities like Kolkata, 
Chennai and Mumbai, others are incredulous like those that forecast 
that the earth would end up drying like Mars. All these news items 
may be mixed up with some facts and fantasies, but undoubtedly, 
they have sufficiently shaken up our apprehensions towards nature. 
That’s why the age-old anthropocentric predicament is being 
suspected as a bane in the pretence of a boon.  
Anthropocentric paradigm is only the tip of the ice-berg. In recent 
years, much of the philosophical canon has come under critical 
scrutiny both from the eastern and western theorists. Critical theory, 
deep ecology, and feminism have all called for a reassessment of the 
Western philosophical heritage (Moyer, 2001).  There is a consensus 
among writers that the western philosophical tradition that endorses 
modernity divides the world thereby fostering domination.  
Delineating the essential feature of this world view, Ashis Nandy, 
an Indian critical theorist opines: 
Many many decades later, in the aftermath of that marvel of 
modern technology called the Second World War and perhaps 




that modern encounter of cultures called Vietnam, it has 
become obvious that the drive for mastery over men is not 
merely a by-product of a faulty political economy but also of a 
world view which believes in the absolute superiority of the 
human over the nonhuman and the subhuman, the masculine 
over the feminine, the adult over the child, the historical over 
the a-historical, and the modern or progressive over the 
traditional or the savage. (Nandy, 2009) 
This world view is very often referred to as ‘the west’ by third world 
countries. It encompasses the whole globe by its most precarious 
weapon called colonialism through modernity, science and 
technology. No wonder Nandy claims that the West is now 
everywhere, within the West and outside; in structures and minds 
(Nandy, 2009). It is assumed that most of the suppression and 
domination around the world are caused due to this world view 
widely represented by the west. Nandy again explains: 
It has become more and more apparent that genocides, eco 
disasters and ethnocides are but the underside of corrupt 
sciences and psychopathic technologies wedded to new 
secular hierarchies, which have reduced major civilizations to 
the status of a set of empty rituals. The ancient forces of human 
greed and violence, one recognizes, have merely found a new 
legitimacy in anthropocentric doctrines of secular salvation, in 
the ideologies of progress, normality and hyper-masculinity, 
and in theories of cumulative growth of science and 
technology. (Nandy, 2009) 
3. The Ecofeminist Agenda 
Ecofeminists, though do not represent a monolithic philosophical 
strand also perceive the modernity in the same shade. Their concern, 
however, is more on the exploitation of nature, the structure and 
nature of such exploitation, and possible solutions for it. The idea 
that the rise of modern science, technology, and capitalism produced 
and relied on the death, domination, and exploitation of nature 
gendered female, and that this reinforced and reflected the cultural 
subordination and exploitation of women, is the kind of large and 
provocative thesis of which academia has too few (Thompson, 2006). 





The term ecofeminism was advanced by Francoise d’Eanbonne in 
1974 to capture women’s potential for bringing about an ecological 
revolution to ensure the survival of the planet. Greta Gaard aptly 
defines, “Ecofeminism is a theory that has evolved from various 
fields of feminist inquiry and activism: peace movements, labour 
movements, women’s health care, and the anti-nuclear, 
environmental, and animal liberation movements. Drawing on the 
insights of ecology, feminism, and socialism, ecofeminism's basic 
premise is that the ideology which authorises oppressions such as 
those based on race, class, gender, sexuality, physical abilities, and 
species is the same ideology which sanctions the oppression of 
nature. Ecofeminism calls for an end to all oppressions, arguing that 
no attempt to liberate women (or any other oppressed group) will be 
successful without an equal attempt to liberate nature. Its theoretical 
base is a sense of self most commonly expressed by women and 
various other nondominant groups - a self that is interconnected 
with all life!” (Gaard, 1993). 
Ecofeminists are not however in consensus on how to achieve such 
a goal. There are divergent strands that run parallel within the 
ecofeminists’ debate. 
1. Women’s participation in resolving the environmental crisis 
is preliminary since women are closer to nature in a special 
way. This is known as the essentialist view in ecofeminism. 
2. The source of exploitation of nature and that of women is 
historically the same patriarchal thought which rests on 
dualistic metaphysics. So to resolve the environmental crisis, 
we have to crash this conceptual cleavage. This is known as 
the conceptualist view in ecofeminism. 
3. A mode of thought rested on the vocabulary of care is 
essential in both cases to comprehend the environmental 
crisis. 
This paper focusses on articulating the structure of vocabulary used 
in ethics of care employed both by the essentialists and the 
conceptualists even though the essentialists’ view is critiqued by the 
ecofeminist writers. The author argues that the idea of an embedded 
self, endorsed by the ecofeminists and also subscribed by many 




dominated groups will provide the much-needed strength for the 
vocabulary of ethics founded on the concept of care. 
The essentialists claim that women have a special connection with 
nature. Thompson puts it, “ecofeminists follow an essentialist 
strategy and argue that women are closer to nature. By their closer 
relationship to nature, it is claimed that women are more likely than 
men to care about nature and are better prepared to do so than men. 
The vocabulary of an ethics of care is seen from this perspective to 
emerge as the essential voice of women's lived experience and sense 
of self as embedded in relationship” (King Roger, 1991). Many 
ecofeminists celebrated women’s putative life-giving and holistic 
reproductive and spiritual capacities and tied these gendered 
qualities to an ability to care for and protect the earth from rapacious 
natural resource extraction, militarism, and ecological disharmony 
(Thompson, 2006). Women, as Salleh puts it, “flow with the system 
of nature” (Salleh, 1984). According to Salleh, “Woman's monthly 
fertility cycle, the tiring symbiosis of pregnancy, the wrench of 
childbirth and the pleasure of suckling an infant, these things 
already ground a woman's consciousness in the knowledge of being 
coterminous with Nature” (Salleh, 1984). 
However, more and more feminist thinkers are detaching 
themselves from this essentialist view. More and more urbanised 
women are as detached as the men from the wilderness in the 
contemporary world. So the claim that women are more connected 
with nature, is losing empirical grounds. King contends, “In the 
increasingly urban societies of Western Europe and North America, 
it might be argued that the relation to nature is no more "given" for 
women than it is for men. Both women and men are increasingly cut 
off from direct experiential relationships with nature, as opposed to 
artificial and urban, environments, and thus, although we are 
unavoidably related to the non-human world, we do not (many of 
us) experience that relationship with nature as "given" in all its 
concreteness and complexity (King Roger, 1991). Similarly, many 
thinkers are also alleging that the essentialist view is in reality 
anthropocentrism in disguise. To paraphrase such predicament of 
allegation Roger J. H. King opines:  





But this quotation underscores the necessity of examining 
what exactly it is that ecofeminists care about when they care 
about nature and how this care is determined by why they feel 
a connection with "lived experience"? The connection with 
nature that Salleh draws upon is the connection to a woman's 
bodily nature or, more precisely, only to her reproductive 
nature. Awareness of this connection and the care for it that 
can emerge have a logic that can link a woman's relation to her 
reproductive nature to a relation to the environment more 
generally. Articulating this logic, many ecofeminists have 
focused on those aspects of environmental destruction that 
impinge directly or indirectly on women's reproductive 
nature, that is, on the consequences of the environmental crisis 
for individual and local community health and the conditions 
necessary for nurturing the life and growth of future 
generations of human beings. (King Roger, 1991) 
4. The Conceptual Agenda 
In contrast, some ecofeminists follow a conceptualist strategy. They 
claim that an ecofeminist environmental ethics must redress the 
conceptual opposition that patriarchal culture sets up between men 
and culture on the one hand and women and nature on the other. 
These dualisms underlie a parallel that exists between the 
oppression of women and the domination of nature in a patriarchal 
society. Although a conceptualist environmental ethics does not 
claim that the vocabulary of care represents the essential moral voice 
of women, this vocabulary does offer conceptual resources that have 
been ignored by much of contemporary environmental ethics 
(Warren, 1990). 
This conceptualist predicament attracted a plethora of feminist 
writers. Carolina Merchant brought out her magnificent book 
entitled the Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific 
Revolution during the 80s which has been regarded as the 
groundwork in ecofeminist philosophy. Robin May Schott 
(1993), Mary Meller (1997), Karen J. Warren (1998), and Val 
Plumwood (1993) have enriched conceptualist literature. Each 
of these celebrated writers sees a conceptual cleavage 




endorsed by the patriarchal thought much common in the 
philosophy of modernity responsible for the ongoing plight of 
nature. The modern philosophy endorses a metaphysical and 
normative dualism which for Plumwood is different from 
mere binary or dichotomy. This dualism contrasted nature 
from culture, men from women, and mind from body. 
Furthermore, it simply did not separate them but 
subordinated one by the other. It created a value hierarchy. 
This predicament, however, gave rise to the vocabulary of 
right versus responsibility, triggered the voice of power 
translated into the language of subordination and domination 
or inferior and superior.  
In her seminal work Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (1993), 
Plumwood enlists the features of such dualist metaphysics. Dualism 
creates two realms known as “backgrounding” and 
“foregrounding”. Things in the “foreground” push the other into the 
“background” to remain in the “foreground”. The master 
(experiencing subject) exists in the foreground and makes use of the 
background. Dualism then excludes the background forever from 
the discussion which Plumwood names radical exclusion or hyper-
separation. The next step follows to objectify the ‘other’, using the 
other as a mere object. This is known as instrumentalism or 
objectification. The “underdog” of the pair is conceptualised as a 
mere means to the “overdog’s” goal or end. The next step of 
exclusion culminates in homogenisation or stereotyping where the 
dominated group is stereotyped or bracketed forever. Plumwood 
therefore, concludes that to smash the exploitation of women or 
nature, this dualism that triggers domination has to be crashed for 
completely.  The central goal of ecofeminism is identifying and 
overcoming normative dualisms and that (such) dualism in the 
received view of nature concludes that nature is inferior to culture 
(Wilson, 1997).  
The centre of such a dualistic predicament is its overemphasis on an 
idea of self which is detached, disengaged and abstract. The idea of 
such a detached self expresses itself in languages of right, justice, 
impartiality and universality. The nature perceived by this module 
as the self’s ‘other’, destruction of it or ‘using’ it for self’s cause is 
considered morally laudable. The opposite voice, which was almost 





silenced within this predicament, depicts a self which is engaged, 
embedded and embodied. The self that is connected with the other 
strongly cares for it.  It does not believe in the power hierarchy. Marti 
Kheel claims that much of the discussion of environmental ethics has 
failed to make "the open admission that we cannot even begin to talk 
about the issue of ethics unless we admit that we care (or feel 
something). And it is here that the emphasis of many feminists on 
personal experience and emotion has much to offer in the way of 
reformulating our traditional notion of ethics" (Kheel, 1985). 
Ecofeminists begin their theory by critiquing theories like moral 
existentialism and deep ecology. Peter Singer and Tom Regan are 
considered to be moral existentialists. They extend moral claims for 
other human beings based on certain abstract and universal traits, 
which the ecofeminists claim to be too abstract to capture. Peter 
Singer for instance bases his theory on the principle of a feeling of 
pain and pleasure on which he extends moral worth of nonhuman 
beings. Similarly, Tom Regan refers to the capacity of being 
conscious as the criterion of moral extension. As a result, we learn to 
perceive the individual, whether human or nonhuman, primarily in 
the light of the traits that have been abstracted. However, as 
Margaret Urban Walker notes, that reliance on general criteria of 
moral worth, “ presses me to view you, for instance, as a holder of a 
certain right, or a promisee ... or a focus of some specifiable set of 
obligatory responses. I am pressed to structure my response or 
appeal to you in terms which I can think of as applying repeatedly 
to any number of other cases” (Walker, 1989).    
For ecofeminists, too much emphasis on generality and abstract 
principles undermine the connectedness of human self and its 
concrete relationship. Such abstract and general principles and their 
vocabulary of rights, duties, and obligations obscure "the 
importance of attending to the needs of those with whom we are in 
relation" (Lauritzen, 1989). Ecofeminists depict human relationship 
and its givenness in nature as a web. As such, human existence is 
necessarily interconnected and moral excellence is about 
maintaining the balance among all these divergent determiners of 
the web. This image "symbolizes the interdependence that is thought 
to characterize human relations, according to feminist thought. We 




are, each of us, at every point in our lives, inextricably tied to others. 
We are always someone's daughter or sister, mother, son, brother or 
father; we are always members of a community" (Lauritzen, 1989). 
For ecofeminists, this community extends beyond the human species 
to our relations with other animals, trees and plants, places and 
ecosystems (Zimmerman, 1987).  
The vocabulary of such a mode of thought will be fundamentally 
different from that of right and justice as depicted in the mode of 
thought which banks on the idea of a detached and disengaged self. 
One can see that this language forms a different voice. To summarise 
the essential feature of such voice Carol Gilligan writes: 
In this conception, the moral problem arises from conflicting 
responsibilities rather than from competing rights, and 
requires for its resolution a mode of thinking that is contextual 
and narrative rather than formal and abstract. This conception 
of morality as concerned with the activity of care centers moral 
development around the understanding of responsibility and 
relationships, just as the conception of morality as fairness ties 
moral development to the understanding of rights and rules. 
(Gilligan, 2003)  
Similarly, Karen Warren opines: 
Ecofeminism is a contextualist ethic. It involves a shift from a 
conception of ethics as primarily a matter of rights, rules, or 
principles pre-determined and applied in specific cases to 
entities viewed as competitors in the context of moral 
standing, to a conception of ethics as growing out of what Jim 
Cheney calls "defining relationships," i.e., relationships 
conceived in some sense as defining who one is... Ecofeminism 
makes a central place for values of care, love, friendship, trust, 
and appropriate reciprocity - values that presuppose that our 
relationships to others are central to our understanding of who 
we are (Warren, 1990).  
The language of such a voice stands on feelings, emotional bindings 
with others. This voice, however, has been silenced by the idea of 
private and public dichotomy. The private is good at maintaining a 
relationship within the boundary of family. However, this is 





inadequate in the public sphere where a relationship is defined by 
top-notch competition and tough bargaining. Contemporary 
political theorists see this public-private dichotomy as a constructed 
and structured myth. For Marx, justice is not required and will not 
be claimed in a perfect society where people respond to others’ needs 
spontaneously. The communitarians, the multiculturalists by their 
respective planes push this idea further. The nucleolus of such 
predicament, however, has to bank upon an idea of self that is 
connected, passionate, engaged, embedded and embodied. The 
connected self is contextual, captures the concrete individual with all 
its givenness. 
5. Conclusion 
The metaphysical stance referred to at the beginning of this paper 
depicted an empty self which is free to question its participation in 
existing social practices, and opt-out of them, should those practices 
seem no longer worth pursuing. This is the worst kind of liberal view 
that made humanity utterly self-centric, individualistic and selfish. 
Rawls summarises this liberal view by saying that ‘the self is prior 
to the ends which are affirmed by it’ (Rawls, 1971) by which he 
means that we can always step back from any particular project and 
question whether we want to continue pursuing it. This is known as 
Kantian view of the self since Kant vehemently views that the self is 
before its socially given roles and relationships, and is free only if it 
is capable of holding these features of its social situation at a distance 
and judging them according to the dictates of reason (Tayler, 1979). 
The utilitarian’s ‘U-agent’ or Kant’s rational man, therefore, became 
too mechanical in the hand of the reason that it lost its rationality. 
For feminists, communitarians or other subaltern groups, this is a 
false view of the self. It ignores the fact that the self is ‘embedded’ or 
‘situated’ in existing social practices, that we cannot always stand 
back and opt-out of them. This self engages itself with the 
commitments and the given. Kymlicka opines, ‘our social roles and 
relationships, or at least some of them, must be taken as given for 
personal deliberation’ (Kymlicka, 2002). As MacIntyre puts it, ‘in 
deciding how to lead our lives, we all approach our own 
circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity...Hence, what 




is good for me has to be the good for one who inhabits these roles’ 
(MacIntyre, 1981). Therefore, an embedded self is preliminary to 
listen to the voices emerged from the wilderness which was 
otherwise subjected to be dominated, domesticated and finally 
destroyed. 
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